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Politics and public relations – should they hang together? 
 
by Kevin Moloney. Bournemouth University 
 
I argue that it is hard to distinguish between public relations and much of 
modern politics in the UK and that an important part of this conflation is 
a thoroughly bad thing. The working styles and job contents of spin 
doctor, lobbyist, event manager, corporate re-brander, special adviser and 
politician are merging, and making the distinctions of former, less 
presentationally conscious times harder to grasp. The merging has been 
given the mightiest of shoves by the behaviour of New Labour and has 
been much encouraged by the Mountfield Report (1998) on government 
communications.1 
 
My thesis of merger is hardly an original one and its negative 
consequences have been warned against by Franklin (2004), Gaber 
(2000) and Jones (1999, 2002) at least. But I want to elaborate it in a 
particular way: firstly to re-assert a clear divide between the two 
functions of policy making and presentation, and secondly to regret the 
excessive influence of promotional culture (Wernick 1991) over politics. 
I’m going to now approach the academic pulpit (apologies) and say that 
reducing the influence of promotional culture is important for the health 
of a liberal democracy. That culture and its communicative expression in 
public relations squeezes out the complicated, conditional, hesitant and 
other-orientated tones and themes in our public discourse. This squeezing 
out is a bad thing for it reduces the babble of our democratic 
conversations and substitutes the blandness of a script. 
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 (Some of this might be familiar with Australian colleagues for I am told 
[by Anne Surma of Murdoch University] that there has been a small 
uproar recently about amounts spent by the Australian government on 
advertising, the latest example being the media campaign it ran to flag 
changes to the legislation on workplace reform. It was felt by many that, 
rather than informing citizens about the detail of changes to the 
legislation, the government promoted/advertised them as ‘good’ for all of 
us.)  
  
 
Popular culture has noted this merging of the political and PR, and has 
made us laugh at the foul mouthed politicos in the recent BBC television 
comedy The Thick of It. I do not think I heard that creep of a minister, 
Hugh Abbott, talk policy except in the context of a defensive or offensive 
spin operation. Hardly surprising given that this elected official is always 
in thrall to that foul mouthed and splenetic bully Malcolm Tucker, who is 
a sound-alike, if not look-alike, enforcer in the style of Alastair 
Campbell. And worse still, Hugh Abbott, appears in thrall to a trio of 
departmental officials (Glen, the special adviser; Ollie, another adviser, 
and Terri, the chief departmental press officer) who regard policy ideas as 
press release ‘stuff’ to spin their minister out of presentational disasters.  
 
Keep these images in your mind, and see how dominant the public 
relations mode has become in politics. Now think back some 25 years to 
the Yes Minister television series. There the focus was not presentation 
but the battle of wits between faux naïve minister Jim Hacker and 
guileful, Jesuitical permanent secretary Sir Humphrey. Note that both 
were attended to by the respectful tyro of a private secretary. The press 
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were no more than a distance threat on the Whitehall horizon. I think, 
therefore, that John Lloyd was correct to write (4.2.06, p. 10) in the 
Financial Times magazine that ‘In recent years, politics has come under 
the sway of image consultancies, public relations . . .’.2 
 
Let’s now leave popular culture and turn to government structures. The 
history of special advisers to UK ministers since the 1960s, when they 
were introduced in significant numbers, illustrates the merging of politics 
and PR. Blick3 (2004) shows that their policy advice and implementation 
roles were primary under the 1964-70 Labour governments but that this 
primacy has declined under Conservative and Labour governments since 
1990. He chronicles (pp. 266-7) their increasing numbers which by 2002 
had half (40) of them doing PR for ministers all the time or part of it.4 
Another sign of merging and conflation is how special advisers, lobbyists 
in public affairs firms, and politicians move around jobs: the core work is 
familiar at the three locations.5   
 
The contemporary cultural dominance of marketing and PR with their 
primary emphasis on self-interested display and exchange is a systemic 
reason for the conflation. How naturally in this culture a Labour Party 
publication for its members can attribute to a Prime Minister the words 
‘We have a good story to tell. We have got to get out and sell it’.6 
Another reason is the judgement by the Labour Party leadership since 
1983 that it had to cultivate better relations with a largely hostile, pro-
Conservative UK press. The consequences were the professionalisation of 
the party’s communications; and the leadership, MPs, apparatachiks and 
activists dropping their often ambiguous, if not hostile, attitude towards 
the media.  The party careers of Peter Mandelson, Alastair Campbell and 
Charlie Whelan are symbolic of this change.7  
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 While it can be said, very sensibly, that this increased emphasis on PR is 
a response to the need to maximise electoral support in a media-saturated, 
competitive, democratic electoral system, it is said much less often that 
the current emphasis blurs the distinctions between policy makers 
(elected politicians and senior civil servants), policy explainers (civil 
service information officers) and policy promoters (special advisers). 
This blurring between policy and presentation and between elected 
politician and support staff makes it harder to identity what politicians 
have decided, and runs the risk of taking power away from them and 
transferring it to experts in presentation. Look at fictional Hugh Abbott. 
For real cases, read (Blick, p. xiv) how Clare Short, formerly Secretary of 
State for International Development, implied the case for separation when 
she told a House of Commons committee in 2002 that:  
 
Alastair Campbell [then chief press spokesperson for the 
government] is responsible for the presentation of government 
policy, and that soon becomes propaganda and there is a place for 
that. Once proper decisions have been made, then the government 
should put forward what it is trying to do as well as it can and 
communicate with the public, but the two often conflate’. 
(emphasis added by Blick).  
 
I am arguing for clear functional space between that proper decision 
making and government public relations. I’m doing so at a time of the 
high water mark of PR influence on modern UK politics. Compare today 
with the start of the PR function in modern government in 1911 when the 
Liberal government sent presenters around the country to explain the first 
public welfare benefits. Compare today with civil servants in national and 
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local government writing in the Journal of Public Administration in the 
1920s and 30s that PR informed people of their welfare rights in housing 
and unemployment pay. In personal terms, the high water has raised up 
Alastair Campbell to be the most influential public relations person in 
British history. In governance terms, this conflation, this merging, makes 
PR an integral part of policy making, and not a second order matter of 
presentation. It leads to allegations that words and evidence about policy 
are ‘sexed up’ (exaggerated) in order to maximise political support. This 
is the PR mindset of self-presentation-for-attention-and-advantage 
inflating the meaning and significance of policy. That mindset was 
alleged to be working in Campbell during his dealings with intelligence 
experts over the 2002 September dossier justifying the decision to invade 
Iraq in 2003.8 A year later, the Butler enquiry (2004) investigated the 
conduct of British intelligence over the war. After the publication of its 
report, one of the enquiry members said ‘Intelligence and public relations 
should be kept apart’.9  
 
If they are to be separated, there is a lot of PR work to be de-merged; to 
stop a trend Franklin (2004, pp 5-7) calls ‘this ambition to package 
politics’10 and what Deacon and Golding (1994, p. 4) name ‘the public 
relations state’.  
 
Merging of another sort (between PR as information giving by civil 
servants and as political advantage by ministerial advisers) is also 
evident. Blick (pp. 266-7) reports how the PR role of the special adviser 
is seen as different from that of civil servants in Whitehall press offices. 
It is the difference between giving factual information and giving political 
explanation. Special advisers could ‘add that extra dimension – to an 
extent be the Minister’s voice’.11  These two roles can be distinguished in 
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a conceptual way but they are too fine to bear the brunt of practice. 
Indeed Blick’s account is, in significant measure, a history of special 
advisers and permanent civil servants clashing over policy presentation 
from two competitive stances – those of government as policy 
implementation, and of government as political competition. The Jo 
Moore affair exemplifies the negative tensions between the two roles 
with famous, deathly advice to bury and not explain.12    
 
From all this, it is clear, I believe, that the basic motivation in public 
relations of self-presentation-for-attention-and-advantage is found too 
much in modern British politics and government. The urgent and constant 
search for media coverage is a shared mindset. More operationally, from 
PR and marketing, politics assimulates attitudes and skills such as: 
research into what electors want through surveys and focus groups; 
sensitivity about personal appearance (£1,300 on prime ministerial make-
up in 2004);  being ‘on message’(bleepers for all MPs in 1997); event 
management (party rallies); creating pseudo-events (water blasting the 
wall free of graffiti)13, and constructing new corporate identities (the 
Cameroons and their public theatre of tieless shirts and bicycling to 
work). This transfer of skills from mass marketing and corporate PR to 
politics14 breaks down into two major components - political marketing 
and news management, known as ‘spin’. I’m not arguing that modern 
government can work without these persuasive communications. In the 
UK, there never has been a golden age when politics and persuasion went 
separate ways, and there never will be. Today modern visible PR (media 
relations, event management, branding) makes the merger between 
governing and persuasion manifest (see Franklin 1994 and 2004; Jones 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2002; Rees 1992; Scammell 1995) and it has its 
democratic uses. PR makes connections between political elites and the 
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mass electorate. McNair (1995, p. 191) puts this well: PR and other 
political marketing techniques make politics a more attractive ‘mass 
spectator sport’ to an electorate who are adept at winnowing out 
manipulation and propaganda from useful information and opinion in 
political communications. He is also correct (1996, p. 52) when he notes 
that ‘mass democracy is inevitably populist democracy in which 
appearance and image, as well as policy substance, have a role to play’. 
 
Instead of no PR in government, I am arguing what I think is Short’s 
case: that the policy making and presentational divide should be re-
established in the interests of asserting the primacy of policy over 
presentation, of the elected official over the appointed one. On a sunny  
day, I would claim that this leads to better decision making. On a cloudy 
day, I would just claim that it reverts to the proper constitutional order of 
elected officials prevailing. Does it also annoy you the way those PR 
types boss the minister around in The Thick of It?  I think that we will 
know that the proper constitutional order is re-established when the 
Downing St press office is moved as a cost saving to Manchester. 
Politicians too might welcome the migration. Tony Blair said in 2002 that 
his first government had overvalued PR (Blick, p. 268), an irony coming 
from a politician near universally liked or disliked for his presentational 
skills. I also wonder what the tieless, bicycling Dave Cameron will think 
if he makes it to Downing St., for he was once a professional PR man? 
His professional past will be used against him. In a reckless act of stone 
throwing inside a very big glasshouse, note that New Labour’s deputy 
prime minister John Prescott has called Cameron a ‘PR man and not a 
politician’.15 
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Cameron’s repositioning of the British Conservatives is instantly 
recognisable to the modern PR person as corporate branding. In terms of 
my argument, it is inoffensive in its presentational aspects. Indeed more 
generally, PR is an acceptable promotional means in the democratic 
competition of electoral positioning and dog fighting. Lloyd (2004, p. x) 
is graphically correct when he says that the ‘ever open maws’ of the 
‘ravenous’ media means that ministers need press aides to feed it with 
‘good’ stories, and to limit the damage of ‘negative’ stories.16  That is all 
fine; that is the tumble of a rough old trade. Policy, however, is about 
ends as well as means: PR is always a means to an end. Politics is 
parasitical about where it finds its persuasive means but it should be the 
master activity in relation to policy, with presentation a secondary 
concern.  
 
The core, therefore, of my case is the re-assertion of the 
policy/presentational divide. On separating the two functions out.  
 
Mountfield wrote (1997, para. 2) that: 
  
Any government needs modern and effective relations with the 
media. The effective communication and explanation of policy and 
decisions should not be an after-thought, but an integral part of a 
democratic government’s duty to govern with consent.  
 
These are carefully crafted words. Who could support communication 
being an after-thought in today’s media-saturated world? Nobody. The 
argument here is not about making presentation an ‘after-thought’. It is 
about making communication a separate and second thought. Policy 
decisions should be first; presentation a separate second. Both functions 
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will often be done by the same person, but the mindsets, and the formal 
processes should be de-merged. 
 
Politics deals principally in a currency of incommeasurable values, goals 
and behaviours, out of which coherence may or may not be produced. 
Presentational skills alone will never make for peace and justice in 
Northern Ireland, Iraq, the Middle East or the poppy fields of southern 
Afghanistan. Or for adequate dental services provided by the National 
Health Service. Or for how children get to secondary schools. Right 
policy is the key driver for good outcomes in our political economy and 
civil society, and so Clare Short is correct to warn of the dangers of 
political actors merging policy making and policy presentation in the 
same, single process. The PR sign does not hang on the door of the policy 
maker. Take it down. 
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1 Chapter 2, para 14 of Mountfield says ‘The effectiveness of communications depends on . . . 
integration within a department of  the development of policy with its communications’. 
2 Lloyd added two other influences – expert networks and thinks tanks. 
3 Blick is one of the few academics writing about government to refer to government ‘public relations’ 
consistently. Most avoid the term and use ‘information’.  
4 Those doing media relations full time were apparently eight in mid-2002. See Blick, p. 266. There 
were 31 special advisers in 1974. See Blick, p. 315. An early ‘spin doctor’ before the term was known 
was John Harris who worked for Roy Jenkins in the late 1960s. See Blick, pp. 110-117. 
5 These examples are provided by Conor MacGrath. Peter Luff: researcher to Conservative MPs Peter 
Walker and Edward Heath in late 1970s/early 1980s; then lobbyist at Good Relations and Lowe Bell in 
late 1980s/early 90s; then Tory MP since 1992. Charles Hendry: special adviser to Conservative MPs 
John Moore and Tony Newton; then public affairs counsellor at Burson-Marsteller; then Tory MP since 
1992. Damien Green: special adviser in 10 Downing Street Policy Unit 92-94; then self-employed 
public affairs consultant 95-97; then Tory MP for Ashford. David Miliband: parliamentary officer, 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations 1987-88; head of policy unit for Labour leader and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair 94-01; MP for South Shields since 2001; Hilary Benn: head of policy and 
communications for MSF trade union; then special adviser to MP David Blunkett; MP for Leeds 
Central since 1999; Charles Clarke: chief of staff to Labour leader Kinnock 1983-92; chief executice 
Quality Public Affairs 1992-97; MP for Norwich South from 1997. 
6 See Labour Today, summer, 2004, p. 9. It is a magazine for members. The words are attributed to 
Tony Blair. 
7 Peter Mandelson was Director of Communications for the Party between 1985 and 1992; Alastair 
Campbell was party press officer for Tony Blair MP from 1994, and then Chief Press Secretary to him 
as Prime Minister 1997-2003; Charlie Whelan was special adviser and press officer 1997-1999 for 
Gordon Brown MP, Chanceller of the Exchequer.  
8 See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3466005.stm> for an account of the dossier’s 
construction. P. 2 reports that ‘Downing Street media chief Alastair Campbell tells JIC chairman John 
Scarlett (intelligence officer) that the “may” in the main text wording of (45 minutes warning of a 
missile attack) claim is “weaker than the summary”’.  A day later ‘Mr Scarlett tells Mr Campbell the 
language on the claim in the main text has been “tightened”’. 
9 See p. 3 of <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3466005.stm>. Enquiry member Field Marshall 
Lord Inge is quoted to this effect. 
10 Franklin reports (p. 16) that between 1997-9, the New Labour government issued 20,000 press 
releases, ‘an 80 per cent increase on the output of the Major government’ (Cohen, 1999b, p. 15). See 
Cohen, N. (1999) ‘An Explosion of Puffery’, New Statesman, November 29, pp. 14-15. 
11 The official giving this explanation in Blick was Mike Granatt, Head of Profession of the then 
Government Information and Communication Service, now the Government Communications 
Network. The quotation is his.  
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12 Jo Moore was special adviser to Stephen Byers MP, Secretary of State for Transport, in 2001. Very 
soon after the Twin Tower terrorist attacks on September 11, she sent an email to the Head of 
Information in the department saying ‘It’s now a very good day to get out anything we want to bury’. 
She later resigned. 
13 See Boorstin (1961) The Image, or What happened to the American Dream, Ch. one for their origins: 
he involves journalists and politicians in their development as well as PR people. 
14 One title for this skills transfer into politics is ‘Machiavellian Marketing’, a movement tracked by 
Harris and Lock (1996). See also Harris et al (1999). 
15 Reported by BBC Radio4 news, 11.2.06 at 8am. 
16 In a study of Australian ‘media advisers’ Richard Phillipps of the University of Sydney, Nepean, 
noted that media advising ‘has gradually evolved as a separate role from that of policy adviser’, p. 32, 
of his unpublished PhD thesis ‘Communicating Politics’ (2000). 
